






















































































































































Why Are Banks Holding So Many 
Excess Reserves?
Todd Keister and James J. McAndrews
The buildup of reserves in the U.S. banking system during the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis has fueled concerns that the Federal Reserve’s 
policies may have failed to stimulate the ﬂ  ow of credit in the 
economy: banks, it appears, are amassing funds rather than 
lending them out. However, a careful examination of the balance 
sheet effects of central bank actions shows that the high level of 
reserves is simply a by-product of the Fed’s new lending facilities 
and asset purchase programs. The total quantity of reserves in 
the banking system reﬂ  ects the scale of the Fed’s policy initiatives, 
but conveys no information about the initiatives’ effects on bank 
lending or on the economy more broadly.
T
he quantity of reserves in the U.S. banking system has grown dramatically 
over the course of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. Reserves are funds held by a bank, 
either as balances on deposit at the Federal Reserve or as cash in the bank’s 
vault or ATMs, that can be used to meet the bank’s legal reserve requirement. The 
level of reserves began to rise following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-
September 2008, climbing from roughly $45 billion to more than $900 billion 
by January 2009 (see the chart on page 2). While required reserves—funds that 
are actually used to fulﬁ  ll a bank’s legal requirement—grew modestly over this 
period, this increase was dwarfed by the large and unprecedented rise in the 
additional balances held, or excess reserves. 
Some commentators see the surge in excess reserves as a troubling develop-
ment—evidence that banks are hoarding funds rather than lending them out 
to households, ﬁ  rms, and other banks. Edlin and Jaffee (2009, p. 2), for example, 
identify the high level of excess reserves as the “problem” behind the continuing 
credit crunch—or, “if not the problem, one heckuva symptom.” Other observers 
see the large increase in excess reserves as a sign that many of the steps taken by 
the Federal Reserve during the crisis have been ineffective. Instead of restoring 
the ﬂ  ow of credit to ﬁ  rms and households, they argue, the money the Fed has lent 
to banks and other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries since September 2008 is sitting idle 
in banks’ reserve accounts.
These views have led to proposals aimed at discouraging banks from holding 
excess reserves. The proposals include placing a tax on excess reserves (Sumner 
2009) or setting a cap on the amount of excess reserves each bank is allowed to 
hold (Dasgupta 2009). Mankiw (2009) notes that economists in earlier eras also 
criticized the stockpiling of money during times of ﬁ  nancial stress and favored 
a tax on money holdings to encourage lending. Relating these past issues to the 2
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current situation, he remarks that “with banks now holding 
substantial excess reserves, [this historical] concern about 
cash hoarding suddenly seems very modern.”
In this edition of Current Issues, we argue that the concerns 
about high levels of reserves are largely unwarranted. Using a 
series of simple examples, we show how central bank liquid-
ity facilities and other credit programs create—essentially as 
a by-product—a large quantity of reserves. While the level 
of required reserves may change modestly with changes in 
bank lending behavior, the vast majority of the newly created 
reserves will end up being held as excess reserves regardless 
of how banks react to the new programs. In other words, the 
substantial buildup of reserves depicted in the chart reﬂ  ects 
the large scale of the Federal Reserve’s policy initiatives, but 
says little or nothing about the programs’ effects on bank 
lending or on the economy more broadly.
This conclusion may seem strange, at ﬁ  rst glance, to readers 
familiar with textbook accounts of the money multiplier. In 
these accounts, an increase in reserves is always “multiplied” 
into a larger increase in the broad money supply and thereby 
raises required reserves until the level of excess reserves is 
negligible. This process has clearly not taken place. After 
presenting our examples, we explain why the money multiplier 
is inoperative in the current environment, where reserves have 
increased to unprecedented levels and the Federal Reserve has 
begun paying interest on those reserves.  We also argue that a 
large increase in the quantity of reserves in the banking system 
need not be inﬂ  ationary, since the central bank can adjust 
short-term interest rates independently of the level of reserves 
by changing the interest rate it pays on reserves.
Central Bank Lending: A Simple Example
To clarify how the types of policies implemented by the 
Federal Reserve over the course of the ﬁ  nancial crisis affect 
individual banks’ balance sheets and the level of reserves in 
the banking system as a whole, we present a simple example. 
Consider the balance sheets of two banks, labeled A and B 
(Exhibit 1). Focus ﬁ  rst on the items in black.  On the liabilities 
side of the balance sheet, each bank has started with $10 of 
capital and has taken in $100 in deposits. On the asset side of 
the balance sheet, both banks hold reserves and make loans. 
For simplicity, we assume that the banks are required to hold 
reserves equaling 10 percent of their deposits, and that each 
bank holds exactly $10 in reserves.
Suppose that Bank B has access to a larger pool of lend-
ing opportunities than does Bank A—perhaps because it is 
located in an area with a higher concentration of ﬁ  rms that 
actively rely on bank loans or because it has special expertise 
in evaluating certain types of loan applications. Whatever the 
reason, Bank B has found it proﬁ  table at the current level of 
interest rates to make $130 of loans, while Bank A has found 
it proﬁ  table to make only $50 of loans. To be able to lend this 
greater amount, Bank B has borrowed $40 from Bank A. This 
interbank loan is represented by the green entries in the banks’ 
balance sheets. The loan is an asset for Bank A, which will 
receive the repayment in the future, and a liability for Bank B. 
Note the important economic role of interbank lending in 
this example: it allows funds to ﬂ  ow to their most productive 
uses, regardless of which bank received the initial deposits. 
The balance sheets in Exhibit 1 reﬂ  ect the normal state of 
affairs, when the interbank market is performing this function 
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.3, “Aggregate Reserves of Depository 
Institutions and the Monetary Base.”











A large increase in the quantity of reserves in the 
banking system need not be inﬂ  ationary, since the 
central bank can adjust short-term interest rates 
independently of the level of reserves.
A central bank’s extension of credit to banks 
during a ﬁ  nancial crisis creates, as a by-product, 
a large quantity of excess reserves.efﬁ  ciently. Note too that total reserves in the banking system 
are $20, all of which are required reserves. Our simple example 
assumes that no excess reserves are held in normal times.
Now suppose that the ﬁ  nancial system enters a period of 
turmoil that disrupts the normal pattern of interbank lending. 
Such a market “freeze” might reﬂ  ect banks’ concerns about the 
creditworthiness of their counterparties or uncertainty about 
their own future funding needs. Suppose that, in this environ-
ment, Bank A is unwilling to continue lending to Bank B. 
This disruption places a strain on Bank B when it must repay 
Bank A: if it is unable to obtain a similar loan elsewhere, or to 
raise new deposits quickly, it will be forced to reduce its loans 
by $40. This cutback in lending would be accompanied by a 
decline in total deposits as the households and ﬁ  rms that had 
borrowed from Bank B scrambled for funds to repay their 
loans, and by a contraction in economic activity.1 
One way the central bank could react to this freeze in 
interbank lending is by using the standard tool of monetary 
policy: a change in interest rates. Central banks typically 
implement monetary policy by setting a target for a particu-
lar short-term interest rate.2 When the central bank lowers 
this target rate, other interest rates tend to decrease as well, 
stimulating economic activity. As a result, some lending 
opportunities that were previously unattractive become 
proﬁ  table. In our example, a decrease in interest rates would 
1 Alternatively, Bank A might be willing to continue lending to Bank B, but at a 
signiﬁ  cantly higher interest rate to compensate for the increased credit risk or 
the uncertainty surrounding its own future need for funding. A key feature of the 
current ﬁ  nancial crisis has been the unusually large spread between the interest 
rate on term (that is, longer than one day) interbank loans, as measured by the 
London interbank offered rate (Libor), and benchmark measures of the overnight 
interest rate. The effects of such a scenario would be similar to the market “freeze” 
discussed above: at a higher interest rate, Bank B would choose to borrow less 
from Bank A and would decrease its level of lending to its customers, leading to 
a contraction in economic activity.
2 In the United States, for example, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
sets a target for the federal funds rate, which is the market interest rate on 
overnight interbank loans. It is worth noting that the special features of the 
federal funds market, including the very short duration of the loans, make it less 
susceptible to freezes and other disruptions than longer term lending markets.
lead Bank A to make more loans as it receives repayment 
from Bank B—a response that would partially offset the 
decline in Bank B’s lending.
Given the nature of the problem in our example, however, 
the central bank might be able to intervene more effectively 
in another way.  Suppose that the central bank chooses not to 
lower its target interest rate and instead lends $40 directly to 
Bank B.  In practice, central banks have lent directly to banks 
in a variety of ways during the ﬁ  nancial crisis, using both 
existing discount window facilities and new programs such 
as the Fed’s Term Auction Facility. In our example, the central 
bank simply credits $40 to Bank B’s reserve account. Bank B 
can then use these funds to repay Bank A without decreasing 
its lending.
The banks’ balance sheets after these actions have taken 
place are shown in Exhibit 2, where the changes from the 
earlier ﬁ  gure appear in red. For Bank B, the loan from the 
central bank has replaced the interbank loan. Bank A now 
holds as reserves the funds that it previously lent to Bank B. 
Note that as a consequence of the central bank’s intervention, 
reserve holdings have increased markedly: while deposits are 
unchanged, total reserves for the two banks have risen from 
$20 to $60 and excess reserves now equal $40.
This simple example illustrates how a central bank’s exten-
sion of credit to banks during a ﬁ  nancial crisis creates, as a 
by-product, a large quantity of excess reserves. Merely looking 
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Merely looking at the aggregate data on bank 
reserves might lead one to conclude that the 
central bank’s policy did nothing to promote 
bank lending. . . . In fact, the central bank’s 
action was highly effective.
EXHIBIT 1
Bank Balance Sheets during Normal Times
Dollars
Bank A Bank B
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Reserves 10   Deposits 100 Reserves 10   Deposits 100
Loans 50  Loans 130   Due to Bank A 40
Due from Bank B 40   
Securities 10  Capital 10 Securities 10  Capital 10
EXHIBIT 2
Bank Balance Sheets after Central Bank 
Lends to Bank B
Dollars
Bank A Bank B
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Reserves 50    Deposits 100 Reserves 10   Deposits 100
Loans 50  Loans 130   Due to Central Bank 40
Securities 10  Capital 10 Securities 10  Capital 104
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at the aggregate data on bank reserves might lead one to 
conclude that the central bank’s policy did nothing to promote 
bank lending, since all of the $40 lent by the central bank ended 
up being held as excess reserves. The example shows that this 
conclusion would be unwarranted. In fact, the central bank’s 
action was highly effective: it prevented Bank B from having 
to reduce its lending to ﬁ  rms and households by $40. 
Excess Reserves and Interest Rates
Actions by a central bank that change the quantity of reserves 
in the banking system also tend to change the level of interest 
rates. Traditionally, bank reserves did not earn any interest. 
If Bank A earns no interest on the reserves it is holding in 
Exhibit 2, it will have an incentive to lend out its excess reserves 
or to use them to buy other short-term assets. These activities 
will, in turn, decrease short-term market interest rates and 
hence may lead to an increase in inﬂ  ationary pressures.  
This link between the quantity of reserves and market 
interest rates implies that the central bank has two distinct 
and potentially conﬂ  icting policy objectives during a ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. In choosing an appropriate target for the short-term 
interest rate, the central bank considers macroeconomic con-
ditions and its forecast for output, employment, and 
inﬂ  ation. In our example, we have assumed that the central 
bank’s target rate is unchanged.3  In choosing an appropri-
ate lending policy, in contrast, the central bank considers the 
nature and severity of the disruption in ﬁ  nancial markets. A 
conﬂ  ict arises because the central bank’s lending policy will 
tend to push the market interest rate below its target level. 
If the amount of central bank lending is relatively small, 
this conﬂ  ict can be resolved using open market operations. In 
particular, the central bank could offset, or sterilize, the effects 
of its lending by selling bonds from its portfolio to remove 
the excess reserves. Returning to our example in Exhibit 2, 
suppose the central bank sells $40 worth of government 
3 In practice, the conditions that led to the freeze in the interbank market might 
change the central bank’s forecast for the factors inﬂ  uencing inﬂ  ation and 
economic growth and, hence, its desired short-term interest rate. Even in such 
a case, however, the central bank’s target rate is likely to differ from the rate that 
would result from Bank A’s efforts to lend out its excess reserves.
bonds from its portfolio and these bonds are all purchased by 
Bank A.  When Bank A pays for these bonds—by giving $40 in 
reserves to the central bank—the quantity of excess reserves 
in the banking system will return to zero. Because Bank A will 
then be holding interest-bearing bonds instead of reserves, 
it will not have an incentive to change its lending behavior. 
In this way, the open market operation prevents market 
interest rates from falling below the central bank’s target. 
Note, however, that this approach is limited by the quantity of 
bonds that the central bank is able to sell from its portfolio.
A second way in which the central bank could eliminate 
the tension between its conﬂ  icting policy objectives is to 
pay interest on reserves.  When banks earn interest on their 
reserves, they have no incentive to lend at interest rates lower 
than the rate paid by the central bank.  The central bank can 
therefore adjust the interest rate it pays on reserves to steer 
the market interest rate toward its target level. In October 
2008, the Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserves 
for the ﬁ  rst time in its history. This action was taken to “give 
the Federal Reserve greater scope to use its lending programs 
to address conditions in credit markets while also maintain-
ing the federal funds rate close to the target established by the 
Federal Open Market Committee” (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 2008).4
In our example in Exhibit 2, suppose the central bank 
sets the interest rate it pays on reserves equal to its target 
for the market interest rate. This policy, advocated by 
4 Many other central banks also pay interest on reserves as part of their procedure 
for implementing monetary policy. See Goodfriend (2002) and Keister, Martin, 
and McAndrews (2008) for a discussion of how paying interest on reserves allows 
a central bank to separate the quantity of bank reserves from its monetary policy 
objectives. See Ennis and Keister (2008) for a more formal treatment of the 
process of monetary policy implementation and the effects of paying interest on 
reserves. Goodfriend (2009) proposes a new way of classifying a central bank’s 
policy tools. In his terminology, monetary policy refers to changes in the monetary 
base (reserves plus currency in circulation), while interest rate policy refers to 
changes in the interest rate paid on reserves and credit policy refers to changes 
in the composition of the central bank’s assets.
[The] link between the quantity of reserves and 
market interest rates implies that the central bank 
has two distinct and potentially conﬂ  icting policy 
objectives during a ﬁ  nancial crisis.
In October 2008, the Federal Reserve began 
paying interest on reserves. . . . This action was 
taken to “give the Federal Reserve greater scope 
to use its lending programs to address conditions 
in credit markets while also maintaining the 
federal funds rate close to the target established 
by the Federal Open Market Committee.”  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   5
Goodfriend (2002), Woodford (2000), and others, removes 
the opportunity cost of holding reserves—that is, the revenue 
forgone by a bank when it does not lend out its excess reserves. 
The interest Bank A earns by holding $40 of excess reserves 
will now be roughly equal to what it previously earned by 
lending to Bank B. As a result, Bank A again has no incentive 
to change its lending behavior and the market interest rate 
will remain at the central bank’s target level.
Other Lending and Purchase Policies
In addition to lending to banks, central banks have imple-
mented a range of other policy responses to the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, including lending directly to ﬁ  rms and purchasing 
certain types of assets. The Federal Reserve, for example, has 
implemented credit programs for primary dealers and other 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, opened currency swap lines with foreign 
central banks, purchased mortgage-backed securities guar-
anteed by certain government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), 
and directly purchased debt issued by housing-related GSEs. 
How do these other types of policies affect the level of reserves 
in the banking system?  
To answer this question, we return to our example. Suppose 
now that the central bank lends $40 directly to Firm X, which 
holds a deposit account at Bank A. In making this loan, the 
central bank credits $40 to Bank A’s reserve account and 
Bank A, in turn, credits $40 to Firm X’s deposit account. 
Bank A’s balance sheet subsequent to these transactions is 
presented in Exhibit 3.
As the exhibit shows, both the deposits and the reserves of 
Bank A have increased by $40. Total reserves in the banking 
system have now risen from $60 to $100. Even though the 
central bank made this loan directly to Firm X and not to a 
bank, the loan still creates an equal amount of reserves in the 
banking system. This is a general principle: loans to banks, 
loans to other ﬁ  rms, and direct asset purchases by the central 
bank all increase the level of reserves in the banking system 
by exactly the amount lent. (See the box on page 7 for a discus-
sion of the relationship between the size of the Fed’s policy 
initiatives and the quantity of total reserves.)
Bank Lending and Total Reserves
When interpreting data on reserves, it is important to keep 
in mind that the quantity of reserves in the banking system 
is determined almost entirely by the central bank’s actions. 
An individual bank can reduce its reserves by lending them 
out or using them to purchase other assets, but these actions 
do not change the total level of reserves in the banking system. 
A discussion of this somewhat counterintuitive point can 
be found in most textbooks on money and banking, but its 
importance in the current environment leads us to offer a 
brief treatment here as well.
Recall Exhibit 3, which showed the balance sheet effects 
of a central bank loan to Firm X. Suppose that Bank A gives a 
new loan of $20 to Firm X, which continues to hold a deposit 
account with Bank A. Bank A makes this loan by crediting $20 
to Firm X’s account. The bank now has a new asset (the loan 
to Firm X) and an offsetting liability (the increase in Firm X’s 
deposit at the bank). Signiﬁ  cantly, Bank A still has $90 of 
reserves in its account. In other words, the loan to Firm X 
does not decrease Bank A’s reserve holdings at all.
Next, suppose that Firm X uses the $60 it has borrowed 
from the central bank and from Bank A to purchase goods and 
services from Firm Y. Suppose further that Firm Y holds its 
deposit account with Bank B. A payment, either in check or 
electronic form, will be made that debits $60 from Bank A’s 
reserve account and credits $60 to Bank B’s reserve account. 
Bank B will then credit these funds to Firm Y’s deposit account, 
so that Bank B has larger assets (a $60 increase in reserves) 
Loans to banks, loans to other ﬁ  rms, and direct 
asset purchases by the central bank all increase 
the level of reserves in the banking system by 
exactly the amount lent.
When interpreting data on reserves, it is 
important to keep in mind that the quantity of 
reserves in the banking system is determined 
almost entirely by the central bank’s actions.
EXHIBIT 3
Bank Balance Sheets after Central Bank 
Lends to Firm X
Dollars
Bank A Bank B
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Reserves 90    Deposits 140 Reserves 10   Deposits 100
Loans 50   Loans 130  Due to Central Bank 40
Securities 10  Capital 10 Securities 10  Capital 106
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and larger liabilities (a $60 increase in deposits). Meanwhile, 
Bank A’s reserves have fallen by $60, as have its deposits. The 
balance sheets of the two banks after these transactions have 
been completed are shown in Exhibit 4. What is most note-
worthy is that the total amount of reserves in the banking 
system has not changed: it is still $100. The $20 loan and the 
subsequent $60 purchase by Firm X have simply transferred 
funds from the reserve account of Bank A to that of Bank B.
The general idea here should be clear: while an individual 
bank may reduce the level of reserves it holds by lending to 
ﬁ  rms and/or households, the same is not true of the banking 
system as a whole. No matter how many times the funds are 
lent out by the banks or used to make purchases, total reserves 
in the banking system do not change.  In particular, one can-
not infer from the high level of aggregate reserves in Exhibit 4 
that banks are “hoarding” funds rather than lending them out. 
The total quantity of reserves is determined almost entirely by 
the central bank’s actions, and in no way reﬂ  ects the lending 
behavior of banks.5
5 Some of the factors that change the level of total reserves are not under the 
control of the central bank, such as payments into and out of the Treasury’s 
account at the central bank or changes in the amount of currency held by the 
public. However, the changes in these “autonomous factors” have been very small 
compared with the changes in reserves depicted in the chart on page 2. For the 
purposes of this discussion, one can safely disregard these other factors and focus 
solely on how the level of reserves is affected by the size of the central bank’s 
policy initiatives.
Required versus Excess Reserves
While lending by banks does not change the total level of 
reserves in the banking system, it does affect the composition 
of that total between required reserves and excess reserves. 
In the situations depicted in Exhibits 3 and 4, for example, the 
new loans made to Firm X and the corresponding increase in 
deposits will raise the level of required reserves. Nevertheless, 
the vast majority of the newly created reserves are held as 
excess reserves.
This last point is apparent in the changes our two banks’ 
balance sheets undergo from Exhibit 1 to Exhibit 4. Under the 
assumption that the required reserve ratio is 10 percent for 
all deposits, required reserves for Banks A and B together will 
increase from $20 to $26. Total reserves in the banking system 
have risen from $20 to $100; if required reserves account for 
$6 of the increase, then excess reserves account for $74, clearly 
a much larger share. Also notable is that the dramatic increase 
in excess reserves coincides with an increase in bank lending—
from $180 in the pre-crisis situation depicted in Exhibit 1 
to $200 following the loans to Firm X recorded in Exhibit 4. 
Together, these facts demonstrate that a steep rise in excess 
reserves cannot be interpreted as evidence that the central 
bank’s actions have been ineffective at promoting the ﬂ  ow of 
credit to ﬁ  rms and households.
What about the Money Multiplier?
The fact that banks continue to hold a large quantity of excess 
reserves conﬂ  icts with the traditional notion of the money 
multiplier. According to this notion, an increase in bank 
reserves should be “multiplied” into a much larger increase in 
the broad money supply as banks expand their deposits and 
lending activities. The expansion of deposits, in turn, should 
raise the level of required reserves until there are little or no 
excess reserves in the banking system. This process has clearly 
not occurred following the increase in reserves depicted in the 
chart on page 2. Why has the money multiplier “failed” here?
Textbook accounts of the money multiplier assume that 
banks do not earn interest on their reserves. As noted earlier, 
While an individual bank may reduce the level 
of reserves it holds by lending to ﬁ  rms and/or 
households, the same is not true of the banking 
system as a whole.
A steep rise in excess reserves cannot be 
interpreted as evidence that the central bank’s 
actions have been ineffective at promoting 
the ﬂ  ow of credit to ﬁ  rms and households.
EXHIBIT 4
Bank Balance Sheets with Increased 
Lending by Bank B
Dollars
Bank A Bank B
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Reserves 30    Deposits 100 Reserves 70   Deposits 160
Loans 70   Loans 130  Due to Central Bank 40
Securities 10  Capital 10 Securities 10  Capital 10  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   7
  Sources of Bank Reserves
Since September 2008, the quantity of reserves in the U.S. banking 
system has been closely tied to the size of the Fed’s liquidity facilities 
and other credit programs. This relationship is highlighted in the chart 
below, which presents the total assets of the Federal Reserve System in 
the top half of the image and the total liabilities of the System in the 
bottom half.a Before the crisis (left portion of the chart), the Federal 
Reserve’s assets were predominantly Treasury securities, as indicated by 
the gold area in the top half of the image. Its liabilities were predomi-
nantly currency, in the form of Federal Reserve notes, as represented by 
the dark green area in the bottom half of the image. Reserve balances, 
the light green area at the bottom of the image, were small enough to be 
almost unnoticeable.b
The Federal Reserve introduced the ﬁ  rst of its new liquidity facilities 
in December 2007. The total size of the liquidity facilities and other credit 
programs is represented by the light orange area at the top of the image. 
Between December 2007 and September 2008, the Federal Reserve 
actively sterilized these programs through open market operations, 
selling securities from its portfolio to remove the newly created reserves. 
This activity can be seen in the middle portion of the top half of the 
image, where the quantity of Treasury securities falls in a way that 
offsets the growth of the credit programs.
Beginning in September 2008, however, the Federal Reserve increased 
the scale of its initiatives substantially in the face of rapidly deteriorating 
ﬁ  nancial conditions. The size of the credit programs quickly became larger 
than the Fed’s holdings of Treasury securities, so that sterilization through 
open market operations was no longer possible. As a result, reserve 
balances began to grow. To partly offset this growth, the U.S. Treasury 
introduced the Supplementary Financing Program (SFP), represented by 
the grey area in the chart. Under the SFP, the Treasury issued new securi-
ties and left the proceeds from the sale of these securities on deposit at the 
Federal Reserve; the net effect of this operation was to remove reserves 
from the banking system. The size of the SFP was limited, however, and as 
the credit programs continued to expand, reserve balances began to grow 
rapidly. The chart shows how total reserve balances have evolved in a way 
that closely mirrors the changing size of these programs.
The Federal Reserve’s large-scale purchases of assets, ﬁ  rst announced 
in November 2008, can also be seen in the chart. As the programs for 
purchasing agency mortgage-backed securities, agency debt, and longer 
term Treasury debt became operational in early 2009, the amount of 
securities held outright (the gold area) began to increase. Such purchases 
tend to increase the level of reserve balances. However, use of the credit 
programs declined over this period, leaving the total level of reserve 
balances roughly unchanged.c
a We are grateful to Ruth Judson, who created the original design for this chart 
and generously shared her expertise with us. 
b The light green area in the chart represents only those reserves that are held 
as balances on deposit at the Federal Reserve. Reserves that are held as cash 
in a bank’s vault or ATM network are counted as currency and included in the 
dark green area. This latter component of reserves has been relatively constant 
over the course of the crisis; reserve balances account for almost all of the 
increase in total reserves.
c The credit programs plotted in the chart include the following items from 
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1: term auction credit, other loans 
(including discount window loans, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper 
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, credit extended to American 
International Group Inc., and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility), 
net portfolio holdings of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, net portfolio 
holdings of the various Maiden Lane LLCs, and central bank liquidity swaps.
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances.”
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interest on reserves to prevent the increase in reserves from 
driving market interest rates below the level it deemed appro-
priate given macroeconomic conditions.  In such a situation, 
the absence of a money-multiplier effect should be neither 
surprising nor troubling.
Is the Large Quantity of Reserves Inﬂ  ationary?
Some observers have expressed concern that the large quan-
tity of reserves will lead to an increase in the inﬂ  ation rate 
unless the Federal Reserve acts to remove them quickly once 
the economy begins to recover. Meltzer (2009), for example, 
worries that “the enormous increase in bank reserves—
caused by the Fed’s purchases of bonds and mortgages—
will surely bring on severe inﬂ  ation if allowed to remain.” 
Feldstein (2009) expresses a similar concern, noting that 
“when the economy begins to recover, these reserves can be 
converted into new loans and faster money growth” that will 
eventually prove inﬂ  ationary. Under a traditional operating 
framework, in which the central bank inﬂ  uences interest rates 
and the level of economic activity by changing the quantity 
of reserves, these concerns would be justiﬁ  ed. Now that the 
Federal Reserve is paying interest on reserves, however, 
matters are different.
A recovering economy will bring increased investment 
opportunities, spurring ﬁ  rms’ demands for bank loans. 
Consequently, banks will be presented with more lending 
opportunities that are proﬁ  table at the current level of inter-
est rates. As banks lend more, new deposits will be created 
and the general level of economic activity will rise.  Left 
unchecked, this growth in lending and economic activity may 
generate inﬂ  ationary pressures. Under a traditional operating 
framework, in which no interest is paid on reserves, the cen-
tral bank would indeed have to remove nearly all of the excess 
reserves from the banking system in order to raise market 
interest rates and curb banks’ willingness to lend.
a bank holding excess reserves in such an environment will 
seek to lend out those reserves at any positive interest rate, and 
this additional lending will lower the short-term interest rate. 
This lending also creates additional deposits in the banking 
system and thus leads to a small increase in reserve require-
ments, as described in the previous section.  Because the 
increase in required reserves is small, however, the supply 
of excess reserves remains large. The process then repeats 
itself, with banks making more new loans and the short-term 
interest rate falling further.
The multiplier process could continue until excess reserves 
are eliminated—that is, until the increase in lending and 
deposits has raised required reserves all the way up to the level 
of total reserves. If this happens, the money multiplier will be 
fully operational. However, the process will stop earlier if 
the short-term interest rate reaches zero. When the market 
interest rate is zero, the opportunity cost associated with 
holding reserves disappears. At this point, banks no longer 
have an incentive to lend out their excess reserves, and the 
multiplier process halts.
As noted earlier, however, most central banks now pay 
interest on reserves. When reserves earn interest, the multi-
plier process will not continue to the point where the market 
interest rate is zero. Rather, it will stop when the market rate 
reaches the rate paid by the central bank, since if these rates are 
the same, banks no longer face an opportunity cost of holding 
reserves. If the central bank pays interest on reserves at its 
target interest rate, as we assumed in our example above, then 
banks never face an opportunity cost of holding reserves and 
the money multiplier does not come into play.
It is important to keep in mind that the excess reserves 
in our example were not created with the goal of lowering 
interest rates or increasing bank lending signiﬁ  cantly rela-
tive to pre-crisis levels. Rather, these reserves were created as 
a by-product of policies designed to mitigate the effects of a 
disruption in ﬁ  nancial markets. In fact, the central bank paid 
Textbook accounts of the money multiplier 
assume that banks do not earn interest on their 
reserves. . . . If the central bank pays interest on 
reserves at its target interest rate, . . . then banks 
never face an opportunity cost of holding reserves 
and the money multiplier does not come into play.
Paying interest on reserves allows the central 
bank to follow a path for short-term interest 
rates that is independent of the level of reserves. 
By choosing this path appropriately, the central 
bank can guard against inﬂ  ationary pressures 
even if ﬁ  nancial conditions lead it to maintain 
a high level of excess reserves.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   9
as the Federal Reserve began to do in October 2008.  Paying 
interest on reserves allows a central bank to maintain its inﬂ  u-
ence over market interest rates irrespective of the quantity 
of reserves in the banking system. The central bank can then 
scale its policy initiatives according to conditions in the ﬁ  nan-
cial sector, while setting its target for the short-term interest 
rate in response to macroeconomic conditions. This ability 
to separate short-term interest rates from the quantity of 
reserves is particularly important during the recovery from a 
ﬁ  nancial crisis. If inﬂ  ationary pressures begin to appear while 
the crisis-related programs are still in place, the central bank 
can use its interest-on-reserves policy to raise interest rates 
without necessarily removing all of the newly created reserves.
The authors are grateful to Gian Luca Clementi, James Clouse, 
Huberto Ennis, Michael Feroli, Marvin Goodfriend, Helios Herrera, 
Sangeeta Pratap, and John Robertson for valuable comments.
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Paying interest on reserves breaks this link between the 
quantity of reserves and banks’ willingness to lend. By rais-
ing the interest rate it pays on reserves, the central bank can 
increase market rates and slow the growth of bank lending 
and economic activity without changing the quantity of 
reserves. In other words, paying interest on reserves allows the 
central bank to follow a path for short-term interest rates that 
is independent of the level of reserves. By choosing this path 
appropriately, the central bank can guard against inﬂ  ationary 
pressures even if ﬁ  nancial conditions lead it to maintain a high 
level of excess reserves.6
This logic applies equally well when ﬁ  nancial conditions 
are stable. A central bank may choose to maintain a high level 
of reserve balances in normal times because doing so offers 
some important advantages, particularly for the operation of 
the payments system. For example, when banks hold more 
reserves, they tend to rely less on daylight credit from the 
central bank to make their payments. They also tend to send 
payments earlier in the day, which reduces the likelihood 
of a signiﬁ  cant operational disruption or of gridlock in the 
payments system. To capture these beneﬁ  ts, a central bank 
may opt to create a high level of reserves as part of its normal 
operations, again using the interest rate it pays on reserves 
to inﬂ  uence market interest rates. The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand has used this type of framework since 2006.7
Conclusion
We began this article by asking, Why are banks holding so 
many excess reserves? We then used a series of simple 
examples to answer this question in two steps. First, we 
showed that the liquidity facilities and other credit programs 
introduced by the Federal Reserve in response to the crisis 
have created, as a by-product, a large quantity of reserves in 
the banking system.  Second, we showed that while the lending 
decisions and other activities of banks may result in small 
changes in the level of required reserves, the vast majority of 
the newly created reserves will end up being held as excess 
reserves. The dramatic buildup of excess reserves reﬂ  ects the 
large scale of the Federal Reserve’s policy initiatives; it conveys 
no information about the effects of these initiatives on bank 
lending or on the level of economic activity.
We also discussed the importance of paying interest on 
reserves when the level of excess reserves is unusually high, 
6 See Borio and Disyatat (2009) for an extensive discussion of this issue.
7 See Ennis and Weinberg (2007) for an analysis of the relationships between 
paying interest on reserves, the level of reserve balances, and the operation of the 
payments system.  See Nield (2008) for a detailed discussion of the Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand’s operating framework.
The dramatic buildup of excess reserves reﬂ  ects 
the large scale of the Federal Reserve’s policy 
initiatives; it conveys no information about 
the effects of these initiatives on bank lending 
or on the level of economic activity.10
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The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility
Tobias Adrian, Christopher R. Burke, and James J. McAndrews
August 2009, Volume 15, Number 4
As liquidity conditions in the “repo market”—the market where 
broker-dealers obtain ﬁ  nancing for their securities—deteriorated 
following the near-bankruptcy of Bear Stearns in March 2008, 
the Federal Reserve took the step of creating a special facility to 
provide overnight loans to dealers that have a trading relation-
ship with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Six months later, 
in the wake of new strains in the repo market, the Fed expanded 
the facility by broadening the types of collateral accepted for 
loans. Both initiatives were designed to help restore the orderly 
functioning of the market and to prevent the spillover of distress 
to other ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms.
The Term Securities Lending Facility: Origin, 
Design, and Effects
Michael J. Fleming, Warren B. Hrung, and Frank M. Keane
February 2009, Volume 15, Number 2
The Federal Reserve launched the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF) in 2008 to promote liquidity in the funding 
markets and improve the operation of the broader ﬁ  nancial 
markets. The facility increases the ability of dealers to obtain 
cash in the private market by enabling them to pledge securities 
temporarily as collateral for Treasuries, which are relatively easy 
to ﬁ  nance. The TSLF thus reduces the need for dealers to sell 
assets into illiquid markets as well as lessens the likelihood 
of a loss of conﬁ  dence among lenders.
The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility
Olivier Armantier, Sandra Krieger, and James J. McAndrews
July 2008, Volume 14, Number 5
As liquidity conditions in the term funding markets grew 
increasingly strained in late 2007, the Federal Reserve began 
making funds available directly to banks through a new tool,
the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The TAF provides term funding 
on a collateralized basis, at interest rates and amounts set by 
auction. The facility is designed to improve liquidity by making 
it easier for sound institutions to borrow when the markets are 
not operating efﬁ  ciently.
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